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ABSTRACT
This note shows that the assumptions about the abatement technology modify the impact of
the environmental taxation (both the size and the “direction”) on the long-run growth driven by
human capital accumulation à la Lucas (1988), when the source of pollution is private consump-
tion and lifetime is ﬁnite.
When the human capital’s share in the abatement services production is higher (respectively
lower) than in the ﬁnal output production, a higher environmental tax reduces (resp. increases)
the allocation of human capital in production sectors (abatement service and ﬁnal output) and
boostes (resp. decreases) the BGP rate of growth. When abatement services are produced with the
ﬁnal output, the environmental taxation does not inﬂuence growth.
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11 INTRODUCTION
Theinﬂuenceoftheenvironmentalpolicyonlong-rungrowthdrivenbyhumancapitalaccumulation
à la Lucas (1988) has been studied by several authors. They highlighted the importance of assump-
tions about the inﬂuence of pollution on the productivity of education (Gradus and Smulders, 1996;
van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen, 1995), about endogenous labor supply (Hettich, 1998), about prefer-
ences for schooling (Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007), about ﬁnite lifetime (Pautrel, 2008a) or about
the negative impact of pollution on health (Pautrel, 2008b, 2009), on the outcome of the environmen-
tal taxation on long-run human capital accumulation.
All these works give insightful results on the way the deterioration of the environment affects
growth when the channel of transmission is education. Unfortunately, some of these results are very
sensitive to the source of pollution: when pollution originates from ﬁnal output rather than physical
capital, Hettich (1998) with endogenous labor supply and Pautrel (2008a) with ﬁnite lifetime do not
ﬁnd any inﬂuence of the environmental policy on education in the long-run, anymore.
This note re-investigates the impact of the environmental tax when the channel of transmission
is education, in the case of ﬁnite lifetime, by considering an alternative source of pollution, that
is private consumption, and by assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology using physical capital and
human capital to produce abatement services.1 It demonstrates that the existence and the sign of the
environmental tax’ impact on human capital accumulation along the balanced growth path depends
on the technology in the abatement services production. When the human capital’s share in the
abatement sector is higher (respectively lower) than in the ﬁnal output sector, the environmental tax
on consumption boosts (resp. decreases) human capital accumulation.
2 THE MODEL
Let’s consider a Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model with human capital
accumulation and environmental concerns. Time is continuous. Each individual born at time s faces
a constant probability of death per unit of time β ≥ 0. Consequently his life expectancy is 1/β. When
β increases, the life span decreases. At time s, a cohort of size β is born. At time t ≥ s, this cohort
has a size equal to βe−β(t−s) and the constant population is equal to
R t
−∞ βe−β(t−s)ds = 1. There are
insurance companies and there is no bequest motive.
The expected utility function of an agent born at s ≤ t is:
Z ∞
s
[logc(s,t) − ζ logS(t)]e−(%+β)(t−s)dt (1)
where c(s,t) denotes consumption in period t of an agent born at time s, % ≥ 0 is the rate of time
preference, S(t) is the stock of pollution at date t and ζ > 0 measures the weight in utility attached
1That assumption enables us to distance our analysis to the existing literature by taking into account that abatement
services could be produced with a technology different from the one used to produce ﬁnal output.
2to the environment.
The representative agent can increase his stock of human capital by devoting time to schooling,
according to Lucas (1988):
˙ h(s,t) = B [1 − u(s,t)]h(s,t) (2)
where B is the efﬁciency of schooling activities, u(s,t) ∈]0,1[ is the part of human capital allocated
to productive activities at time t for the generation born at s and h(s,t) is the stock of human capital
at time t of an individual born at time s. We assume that the human capital of the agent when
he borns, h(s,s), is inherited from the dying generation (Song, 2002). Because the mechanism of
intergenerational transmission of knowledge is complex, we consider that newborn inherit from the
dying generation the average aggregate human capital stock, that is h(s,s) = H(s) (population being
equal to unity).2
Households face the following budget constraint:
˙ a(s,t) = [r(t) + β]a(s,t) + u(s,t)h(s,t)w(t) − (1 + τ)c(s,t) (3)
where a(s,t) is the ﬁnancial wealth in period t and ω(t) represents the wage rate per effective unit
of human capital u(s,t)h(s,t). τ represents the environmental tax that the government imposes on
individual consumption which is the source of pollution (see below). In addition to the budget con-








The representative agent chooses the time path for c(s,t) and his working time u(s,t) by maximizing
(1) subject to (2) and (3). It yields
˙ c(s,t) = [r − %]c(s,t) (4)












t [r(ζ)+β]dζdν is the present value of lifetime earning. It also
gives the equality between the rate of returns to human capital and the effective rate of interest (the
interest rate on the debt r plus the insurance premium β the agent has to pay when borrowing (see
Blanchard and Fisher, 1989)):
˙ w(t)
w(t)
+ B = r(t) + β (6)
2Assuming that h(t,t) = ηH(t) with η ∈]0,1[, like Song (2002), would not modify our qualitative results. Proof upon
request.
3Due to the simple demographic structure, all individual variables are additive across individuals.









[K(t) + Ω(t)] (7)
where Ω(t) ≡
R t
−∞ ω(s,t)βe−β(t−s)ds is aggregate human wealth in the economy. The aggregate stock










In the economy, a government taxes the source of pollution (the individual consumption) at an
exogenous tax rate τ ∈]0,1[ and uses the revenues from the tax τ C(t) to provide abatement services
that improve the environmental quality. His budget is balanced at each date (see below).
There are two production sectors that operate under perfect competition: one produces ﬁnal out-
put denoted Y , the other produces abatement services denoted D. The ﬁnal output is produced with
the following technology:
Y (t) = (φ(t)K(t))α(µ(t)Hp(t))1−α, with φ, µ, α ∈]0,1[ (9)
whereµ(t)Hp(t)istheamountoftheaggregatestockofhumancapitaldevotedtoproduction(Hp(t) ≡ hR t
−∞ u(s,t)h(s,t)βe−β(t−s)ds
i
) that is used in output production (with represent a part µ ∈]0,1[ of
Hp(t)). And φ(t)K(t) is the part of the physical capital stock used in output production. Firms in the
ﬁnal output sector maximize proﬁt Y (t) − r(t)φ(t)K(t) − w(t)µ(t)Hp(t) by equating factor rewards
to marginal productivity:
r(t) = αY (t)/(φ(t)K(t)), and w(t) = (1 − α)Y (t)/(µ(t)Hp(t)) (10)
The abatement sector produces abatement services aimed at curbing the emissions of pollution.
Physical and human capital are used in the abatement sector with the following constant-returns
technology:
D(t) = [(1 − φ(t))K(t)]
ψ [(1 − µ(t))Hp(t)]
1−ψ , with ψ ∈ [0,1] (11)
Note that when ψ = α the abatement services sector uses the same technology than output sector,
that is abatement services are produced with output. When ψ = 1 we are in the case of Michel
4and Rotillon (1995) where only physical capital is used in the production of abatement services. The
government purchases the abatement services D(t) at a price PD(t), deﬁned by proﬁt maximization
and publicly provides them to the economy. Its budget being balanced at each date the revenue of
the environmental tax funds the abatement services expenditures
τC(t) = PD(t)D(t) (12)
Proﬁt maximisation in the abatement services sector gives:
w(t) = (1−ψ)PD(t)D(t)/((1−µ(t))Hp(t)) and r(t) = ψPD(t)D(t)/((1−φ(t))K(t)) (13)










(1 − ψ)τ C(t)
(1 − µ(t))Hp(t)




Furthermore, because physical capital and human capital are used in output production and abate-














The stock of pollution, denoted by S(t), evolves according to two opposite forces. On the one
hand, it increases in the net ﬂow of pollution, the pollutant emissions to abatement services ratio
C(t)/D(t). On the other hand, it decreases due to a natural rate of decay ζ > 0, such that:





− ζS(t), with f(·) > 0, f0(·) > 0, f00(·) > 0 (17)
3 THE ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND THE BALANCED GROWTH PATH
The ﬁnal output is used either to consume, either to invest in physical capital. Therefore, the market
clearing condition is:
Y (t) = C(t) + ˙ K(t).
with ˙ K(t) = dK(t)/dt. Differentiating (8) with respect to time and using the fact that u(s,t) = u(t),3
the aggregate accumulation of human capital is:
˙ H(t) = B [1 − u(t)]H(t) (18)
3Using (10), the equalization of the rates of returns given by equation (6) implies that the rate of returns to human capital
is independent of s, therefore all individuals allocate the same effort to schooling: u(s,t) = u(t).









[βC(t) − βc(t,t)] (19)
Aggregate consumption growth differs from individual consumption growth by the term into brack-
ets −[βC(t) − βc(t,t)] which represents what Heijdra and Ligthart (2000) called the “generational
turnover effect”. This effect appears because at each date a cross-section of the existing popula-
tion dies (reducing aggregate consumption growth by βC(t)) and a new generation is born (adding
βc(t,t)). Because new agents born without ﬁnancial assets, their consumption c(t,t) is lower than the
average consumption C(t) and therefore the “generational turnover effect” reduces the growth rate
of the aggregate consumption.
Using the expression of dK(t)/dt, dΩ(t)/dt and equation (4) we obtain:






The generational effect rises with the probability to die β: on one hand, agents die at a higher fre-
quency (that increases the generational turnover) and on the other hand the propensity to consume
out of wealth % + β increases due to the shorter horizon.
Along the balanced growth path, C, K, H, D, and Y evolve at a common positive rate of growth
(denoted g?, where a ? means “along the BGP ”) and the allocation of human capital across sectors
is constant. As a consequence, denoting x(t) ≡ C(t)/K(t) and b(t) ≡ H(t)/K(t), along the balanced
growth path ˙ x = ˙ b = ˙ u = ˙ w(t) = ˙ φ(t) = ˙ µ(t) = 0, x = x?, b = b?, u = u? and g? > 0.






(b?u?)1−α − x? = B(1 − u?) (BGP 1)
















(b?u?)1−α − x? (BGP 2)






(b?u?)1−α = B − β (BGP 3)
that deﬁnes the interest rate (the LHS member) along the BGP as exogenous. Finally, we have









Combining equations (BGP 1)-(BGP 4) enables us to write












αB(u + α−1 − 1) − β

[Bu − β − %] − β(% + β)
When β > 0 (ﬁnite lifetime):
if α < ψ then ∂u?/∂τ > 0
if α = ψ then ∂u?/∂τ = 0
if α > ψ then ∂u?/∂τ < 0
When β = 0 (iniﬁnite lifetime), ∂u?/∂τ = 0, ∀α,ψ.
Proof. Combining (BGP 1), (BGP 2) and (BGP 3) gives an expression of x? with respect to u?. Com-
bining (BGP 1) and (BGP 3) gives a second expression of x? with respect to u?. Equating the two





αB(u? + α−1 − 1) − β

[Bu? − β − %] − β(% + β) = 0





results from the fact that Γ(·) is a continuous increasing function of u
with Γ(
%+β





αB(u + α−1 − 1) − β

[Bu − β − %] T 0 if α T ψ
Using the implicit function theorem ∂u?/∂τ S 0 if α T ψ. When β = 0, Γ(u?;τ) = 0 for u? = %/B,
independent from τ. 
Furthermore
Corollary 1. From Proposition 1 and equation (18) that gives g? = B(1 − u?) it comes:
When β > 0 (ﬁnite lifetime):
if α < ψ then ∂g?/∂τ < 0
if α = ψ then ∂g?/∂τ = 0
if α > ψ then ∂g?/∂τ > 0
When β = 0 (iniﬁnite lifetime), ∂g?/∂τ = 0, ∀α,ψ.
7Therefore when ﬁnal consumption is the source of pollution and lifetime is ﬁnite, the inﬂuence
of the environmental tax on the BGP growth rate depends on the technology in the abatement sector
with respect to the technology in the output production sector (that is consumed by the agents).
Thus, when the human capital’s share in the abatement sector is higher (respectively lower) than
in the ﬁnal output sector, that is α > ψ (resp. α < ψ), a higher environmental tax reduces (resp.
increases) u? the allocation of human capital in production sectors and boostes (resp. decreases) the
BGP rate of growth. When abatement services are produced with the ﬁnal output (α = ψ), the envi-
ronmental taxation does not inﬂuence growth.
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